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THE UNNESDED BEHEMOTH
Over the past twenty eight years the federal government
has spent one trillion seven hundred billion dollars purchasing
final goods and services. Of this total a surprising one
trillion three hundred billion, or about 80 percent, was
spent on national defense. Despite this massive flow of arms
spending, a flow which has risen steadily and irreversibly
from a healthy $15 bill, per annum in 1946 to a prodigious
$74 bill, in 1973, the US now has less security, less defense
2
against attack, than ever before. The steady three decade
long decline of national security is due, of course, to the
development of nuclear warheads and missile delivery systems
by both the US and USSR. The very high and still rising cost
of this lack of security, though, is in large part due to the
Pentagon's proclivity to purchase hugh, enormously expensive,
but relatively ineffective weapons systems which add much to
society* s tax burden but little or nothing to its security.
History provides us with many examples of the Pentagon's
wasteful procurement practices, but the multibillion dollar
Trident submarine program now being funded by Congress
illustrates most perfectly the unwise arms buying policies
of the defense establishment.
Although the Trident submarine program has been under
way for some years, it is just now beginning to take rapidly
growing multibillion dollar yearly bites out of the public
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3purse. The essential features of this eagerly sought and
forcefully pushed system involve (a) constructing 10 hugh
nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines, (b) equiping
each of these submarines with 24 new long range missiles
called the C-4, and (c) basing all ten submarines at a new
facility to be built on the west coast at Bangor, Washington.
Assuming no cost over-runs, the total investment or capital
cost of this program is presently estimated to be $13.5 bill.,
making it the most expensive weapons system ever proposed
by the Department of Defense. In addition, the ten year
operating and maintenance cost of this 10 ship fleet has
4been calculated to be in the neighborhood of $4.4 bill.
The 24 C-4 ballistic missiles to be carried aboard each
Trident submarine .will have a range of over 4,000 miles,
which is just about twice the range of the Navy's current
missiles. Each C-4 missile will be armed with 17 independently
targeted nuclear warheads, giving each Trident submarine the
capacity to attack 408 (24x17) different cities. When the
entire fleet is completed early in the next decade, it will
carry an astounding 4,080 (10x24x17) independently targeted
nuclear weapons and so be able to destroy that many different
cities from a distance of over 4,000 miles. Not only will
the Trident be the single most expensive weapons system ever
produced, it will also be one of the most devastating man
has ever developed.
The first Trident is scheduled to be completed in 1978,
with the tenth coming along late in 1983. Current plans
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call for the 10 Tridents to replace 10 now operating Polaris
submarines. Each of the to-be-replaced Polaris submarines
carries 16 ballistic missiles having a range of 2,500 miles.
The 16 missiles carried aboard each Polaris, though, are armed
with three non-independent ly targeted nuclear weapons. Thus,
in marked contrast to the planned Trident fleet, the Polaris
fleet can attack only 160 cities from a distance of 2,500
miles. The ten year operating and maintenance cost of this
5fleet is estimated to be in the neighborhood of $1.6 bill.
All in all, the Navy's plan to replace 10 Polaris submarines
with 10 Tridents would add 3,920 [-(10x16) + (10x24x17)]
independently targeted nuclear warheads to their strategic
offensive forces. The dollar cost to society of this further
deep plunge into the presently unknown reaches of nuclear
weaponery would be the S13.5 bill, capital cost plus the
$2.8 bill, incremental ten year operating and maintenance
cost of the Trident fleet over the Polaris fleet.
When completed, the 10 Tr-dents will be added to an already
existing fleet of 31 Poseidon ballistic missile submarines.
Each of these latter submarines carries 16 C-3 missiles which
also have a range of 2,500 miles but are armed with 10
independently targeted nuclear warheads. Thus each Poseidon
is capable of attacking 160 different cities, and when this
fleet is completed in 1976, it will carry 4,960 (31x16x10)
independently targeted nuclear warheads and so be able to
attack that many different cities. Adding 10 Tridents and
subtracting 10 Polaris submarines will then move the Navy
from a Polaris-Poseidon fleet capable of destroying 5,120
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cities to a Poseidon-Trident fleet capable of destroying
9,040 cities:
According to the Navy the main advantages of having the
Trident fleet would be (a) the 3,920 additional nuclear weapons
this system would add to its strategic forces, (b) the longer
range of the new C-4 missile, and (c) the relative quietness
of the Trident submarine. We shall examine each of these
claimed advantages in turn, and attempt to assesSthe contribution,
positive or negative, the Trident might be expected to make to
national security.
To appraise the strategic worth of the 3,920 additional
ready-to-fire nuclear weapons the Trident will add to the
Navy's offensive forces, we refer to the accompanying chart
which displays the expected effect of a US nuclear attack
on the USSR. The horizontal axis of this diagram measures
the number of nuclear warheads delivered by the US while
the vertical axis plots easily calculable Soviet fatalities
as a percentage of their total oopulation. The curve OA
shown rising through the chart graphs expected Soviet fatalities
as a function of the number of US delivered warheads. As shown,
this curve rises very sharply as high density population centers
til
and industrii concentrations are targeted to begin with. The
function then levels off rapidly after the larger cities of the
USSR have been struck and "low value" towns are targeted. The flat-
tening out of the function OA simply reflects the fact that there
are only 200 cities in the USSR with a population of over 100,000,
and just 1,000 cities and towns of 20,000 and over. 7 Once these
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first thousand cities and towns have been destroyed, few
targets worthy of a nuclear weapon remain. With few targets
remaining, it follows that the damage inflicting capability,
or marginal kill productivity, of additional nuclear warheads
approaches zero.
The chart also shows that by "the end of 1973 the Soviets
had 2,300 nuclear weapons (point S) and the US 7,100 warheads
(point P) in their strategic forces. What is not shown is
that because of the weapons systems now being funded by Congress,
the US will have 7,900 nuclear warheads in its strategic forces
by the, middle of this year and well over 18,000 by the end of
1987. 8
The curve CA points out that for the purposes of nuclear
deterrence, both the US and the USSR possess a vast overabundance
of weapons. Assuming a policy of nuclear deterrence through
assured destruction requires no more than 2 50 independently
9
targeted nuclear warheads as Rathjens and Kistiakowsky argue,
then the US already possess overkill to a factor of 28 and
the Soviets to a factor of 10. Similarly, if deterrence
10
requires no more than 10 weapons as Herbert York suggests,
then the US has 700 and the Soviets 2 30 times as many weapons
as they need. No matter what measure one employs to define
a sufficient deterrence, the curve OA makes it clear that a
vast inventory of overkill exists on both sides of the ocean.
As a result of this extreme overabundance, the nuclear balance
of power between the US and USSR is remarkably insensitive to
even large changes in the numbers of warheads held by either

-6-
country. Both the US and the USSR could half or double their
inventories without much affecting the damage they could
inflict on their opponent, and without affecting at all the
value of their respective deterrences. Even though the nuclear
balance is highly stable, the fact that it is lodged at such
a high weapons count means that if for some reason the policy
of mutual deterrence should fail, the consequences for the
Northern Hemisphere would be altogether disasterous. A failure
in deterrence at a low level of weaponery would not be nearly,
so devastating, while failure at a zero weapons level would
not, of course, be threatening to either the US or USSR.
Disregarding the rapid build up of additional nuclear
weapons by the land based ICBM and B-52 bomber components of
US strategic forces, the Trident program alone would move
the US inventory to a figure of 11,020 warheads (point H on
OA). Since these additional weapons are incapable of either
inflicting additional damage on the USSR or of improving the
effectiveness of our deterrence, these 3,920 additional weapons
are of zero military value at best. Thus, even if the Trident
submarine, its missiles, and its base were free goods, no
rational defense planner would recommend adding even a single
warhead to our presently excessive stock. Certainly no
rational defense planner would recommend adding 4,000 weapons
to our stock at a cost to society of over thirteen billion
dollars.
Even though the Trident program is on these grounds alone
a grievous waste of scarce resources, Congress already has
authorized some $3 bill, for this system. And with the
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prograrn now well under way, the Department of Defense is
asking Congress for an additional $1.4 bill, for the submarine
and $660 mill, more for the development of the C-4 missile
for fiscal year 1975.
A second argument made in support of the Trident has to
do with the longer range of its missile. The 4,000 plus
mile range of the C-4 will give the Trident some 4-r times
as much ocean in which to operate while still being able to
attack its targets in the USSR. This greatly increased area
of operations will make the Trident less susceptable to enemy
detection and destruction, and so more assuredly preserve
the second strike nuclear deterrence of the US. The trouble
with this argument, however, is that this very real advantage
is a function not of the Trident submarine but of the C-4
missile. The existing Poseidon fleet too could be given
4-r- times as much ocean in which to hide by the relatively
inexpensive option of mounting the C-4 directly into the
Poseidon. Doing this would, on the one hand, save up to
$10 bill, in submarine costs and $500 mill, in base development
costs, and, on the other hand, give the Navy a more valuable
fleet at an early date.
That this relatively inexpensive measure is eminently
feasible follows first from the fact that the Navy plans to
test fire the C-4 from a Poseidon hull, and, secondly, after
the Trident fleet has been completed and outfitted with 240
C-4 missiles, the Navy plans to develop a much larger longer
range missile called the D-5 for the Trident. As the D-5
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becomes available to the Trident, the bumped C-4 • s will be
placed aboard 15 or more Poseidon submarines. Thus there is
no question but that the C-4 can be mounted directly into the
Navy's existing submarine hulls. Although the Navy has no
doubts whatsoever concerning the invulnerability of its
present submarine fleet, it follows that if it wants a hedge
against future Soviet anti-submarine developments, it would
be well to drop the Trident, accelerate the development of
the C-4 missile and place it directly aboard the Poseidon fleet.
In addition to saving in the order of $11 bill* in public
"
funds, . exercising this option would provide the Navy with a
Poseidon-C-4 fleet superior to the Trident fleet in two important
respects. First, it would be less vulnerable to enemy attack
simply because 15.. or more Poseidons deploying from a number
of existing bases would be much more difficult for Soviet
anti-submarine forces to trail than would 10 hugh Tridents
all emerging through narrow waters from a single base at
Bangor, Washington. Secondly, the C-4 equiped Poseidon fleet
would be available to the Navy at a much earlier date than
would the C-4 equiped Trident fleet*
A final argument in support of the Trident is that it
will run quieter and so be less vulnerable to detection and
destruction than the Navy's current submarines. What is not
pointed out is that improvements in quietness, propulsion, etc*
could be made on the existing Poseidon fleet at a relatively
12low cost* Doing the latter would also help give the Navy
an improved submarine fleet years before the unneeded Trident
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becomes available.
Judged bluntly, building the $13.5 bill. Trident sub-
marine system will contribute nothing whatsoever either to
the offensive capability of our strategic forces or to their
value as a deterrent to nuclear war. Instead, the Trident
will decrease national security by depriving society of the
resources needed to deal effectively with its pressing domestic
problems, by financially crowding-out relatively inexpensive
but effective improvements in existing weapons systems, and
by forcing the USSR toward further improvements in its own
offensive forces.
Paul Wells
Professor of Economics
University of Illinois
Urbana, Illinois 61801
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